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RECOVERY FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A FETUS
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note traces the history and development of actions for prenatal
wrongful death. It emphasizes the state of the law in Virginia and exam-
ines the rationale of various jurisdictions where courts have chosen to
draw a line for imposing liability. After discussing the role of wrongful
death statutes, this Note concludes with an analysis of the trends in the
law and a prediction of the direction the law will take in the future.
II. FROM Dietrich TO Bonbrest...
The common law traditionally failed to recognize a cause of action for
prenatal torts.1 Dietrich v. Northampton2 was the first American case to
verbalize the common law tradition. In Deitrich, a woman four or five
months pregnant prematurely gave birth to her child after being injured
by the defendant's negligent conduct. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes3
held that the child could not be considered a "person" within the mean-
ing of a statute allowing a cause of action for negligent death.4 Holmes
concluded that:
as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recov-
erable by her, we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not embrace
the plaintiffs intestate within its meaning.5
Although the common law did not allow recovery for prenatal injuries,6
the plaintiff in Dietrich relied on Lord Coke's statement that if a woman
"quick with child"7 is beaten by another, and the child is subsequently
born alive, but soon dies, the person committing the battery is guilty of
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 335 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884), overruled, Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352
Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
3. At the time, Holmes was Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
4. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 242.
5. Id. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 245.
6. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 55.
7. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990) ("quickening" means "[t]he first mo-
tion of the fetus in the womb felt by the mother, occurring usually about the middle of the
term of pregnancy"); see also State v. Patterson, 105 Kan. 9, -, 181 P. 609, (1919) ("quick
with child means when the motion of the fetus becomes perceptible.. ."). But see Regina
v. Wycherley, 173 Eng. Rep. 486, 487 (1838) ("'[q]uick with child' means having
conceived").
391
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
murder.8 Holmes correctly noted that even if Lord Coke's statement were
to be accepted as part of the common law of Massachusetts, it is distin-
guishable because Lord Coke's interpretation of criminal law cannot be so
easily transferred to create civil liability.' Holmes stated the child would
not have been able to recover for the injury even if it had survived.10
Finally, Holmes wrote that he could not find any case that allowed a
cause of action 1 for injuries received while en ventre sa mere." It has
been suggested, however, that a more accurate statement would have
been that Holmes could find no English precedent supporting either
position.' 3
American courts uniformly followed Dietrich's statement of the com-
mon law for sixty years.14 In 1946, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia departed from the Dietrich rule in Bonbrest v.
Kotz.15 The district court permitted a child's father to sue the defendants
for prenatal injuries sustained by the infant when it was negligently taken
from the mother's womb.' 6
In distinguishing Holmes' opinion, the Bonbrest court stressed the fact
that in Dietrich a nonviable child was injured, was born alive, and died
less than one hour later. 7 In Bonbrest, on the other hand, a viable child
was prenatally injured, born alive, and lived.' Although the child in Bon-
brest survived, the issue of viability ultimately provided the "solid factual
8. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 243 (citations omitted).
9. Id. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 243.
10. Id.
11. Id. But see Wallis v. Hodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (1740). In Wallis, the Lord Chancellor
stated:
First, as to the common law, there is the trite case of an infant en ventre sa mere
being vouched in a common recovery; a mother also may justify the detaining of char-
ters on behalf of it; a devise to him is good, . . . a bill may be brought in his behalf,
and this court will grant an injunction in his favor to stay waste .... Secondly, as to
the civil law, nothing is more clear, than that this law considered a child in the
mother's womb absolutely born, to all intents and purposes, for the child's benefit.
Id. at 473; see also Hale v. Hale, 24 Eng. Rep. 25 (1692) (citing Luttrell's case where the
court granted an injunction to stay waste of the unborn child's estate). But see Scatterwood
v. Edge, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (1795) ("[a] devise to an infant en ventre sa mere, by the better
opinions, though various, is not good"). Note, however, that these were all cases 'in equity.
12. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990) (defining en ventre sa mere as "in its
mother's womb").
13. J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 31.03 (r~v. ed.
1988) (citing J. SALAMOND, LAW OF TORTs § 160 (15th ed. 1969)).
14. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 139. In Bonbrest, the infant did not die, but the court departed from the com-
mon law by allowing a recovery for injuries to an unborn child.
17. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 243.
18. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 138. These distinctions are very important. Issues of live
birth and viability are central in the discussion of prenatal torts.
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ground on which the two cases stand distinguished." 19 The court reasoned
that a viable child can live outside its mother and therefore cannot be
considered part of her.2 0 For a viable child to be considered part of its
mother is itself a contradiction in terms. By its very definition, viability
means capable of extra-uterine life.21 Therefore, the court concluded that
the concept of a viable fetus being part of its mother cannot bar a recov-
ery for prenatal injuries to a viable child.22
The Dietrich court had also taken the stance that issues of proof would
be too difficult in prenatal injury cases.23 The court in Bonbrest acknowl-
edged that proof would be difficult, but not necessarily any more difficult
than in other personal injury cases.24 Moreover, the court reasoned that
difficulty of proof is no reason to deny a cause of action.25
The Bonbrest court had scant authority to support this novel deci-
sion.26 The court cited to the Supreme Court of Canada 27 and to civil law
tradition 28 which recognized a recovery for prenatal torts. To further bol-
ster this departure from the common law position, the court quoted effec-
tively both Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Stone regarding the ability
of the common law to change and adapt to changing times.29 In the
United States, the Bonbrest decision is credited with taking the first step
away from the common law denial of prenatal injuries.30
19. Id. at 140.
20. Id.
21. Viability is defined as "[t]hat stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive
systems." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
23. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at -, 52 Am. Rep. at 245.
24. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142.
25. Id. For instance, all personal injury suits must establish the necessary causation to
link the injury to the tort.
26. Id. "The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their wrongful
act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of the individual." Id.
27. Id. at 141. "The wrongful act which constitutes the crime may constitute also a tort,
and if the law recognizes the separate existence of the unborn child sufficiently to punish
the crime, it is difficult to see why it should not also recognize its separate existence for the
purposes of redressing the tort." Id. (quoting Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337
(1933)).
28. See, e.g., Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (furnished for publication in
1949) (decided under civil law); see generally McReynolds, Childhood's End: Wrongful
Death of a Fetus, 42 LA. L. REv. 1411 (1982).
29. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142. "[T]he life of the law has been not logic: it has been
experience." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1938)).
30. See generally Muse & Spinella, The Right of an Infant to Recover for Prenatal In-
jury, 36,VA. L. REv. 611 (1950) (this article gives a comprehensive summary of decisions up
to and including the Bonbrest ruling); cf. Allaire v. Saint Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E.
638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting), overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412
(1953) (Judge Boggs' vigorous dissent in Illinois' adoption of the Dietrich rule is often
quoted and seen as the first step in dismantling the common law mentality).
1991]
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III. ... AND BEYOND
Courts quickly departed from Dietrich v. Northampton and the com-
mon law rule after the Bonbrest v. Kotz decision.31 Today, every jurisdic-
tion recognizes a right of recovery for prenatal injuries 2 so long as the
child survives.83 Courts and commentators, however, disagree about where
to draw the line as to liability. In Bonbrest, the court allowed recovery for
prenatal injuries to a viable child which survived birth.34 Similarly, some
courts require "live birth" as a prerequisite for recovery: if the child is
injured any time after conception, it can recover so long as it is born
alive.35 Virginia recently adopted this position.36 Other courts extend lia-
bility to allow recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable fetus even if the
fetus is stillborn because of the injury.37
The first court to go beyond the "live birth" requirement did so three
years after the Bonbrest decision.38 In Verkennes v. Corniea,39 the court
allowed recovery for prenatal injuries that caused the death of the fetus.
The court held, however, that to recover for the wrongful death of a still-
born fetus, the injury must occur after viability." Thus, Minnesota be-
came the first state to adopt the "viability" rule.41
Once again, the point of contention is where to draw the line as to lia-
bility. The line demarcated by the Bonbrest court, also known as the
"conditional liability" rule,42 is followed in nine jurisdictions.43 These
31. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 55, at 336. The Bonbrest decision "brought about
what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the
whole history of the law of torts." Id.
32. Id. § 55, at 337. The last jurisdiction to deny recovery was Texas. See Leal v. C.C.
Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967) (overruling Magnolia Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Jordon, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935)).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 reporter's note (1) (1977).
34. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946).
35. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977).
36. Kalafut v. Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 389 S.E.2d 681 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Eich v. Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974).
38. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
39. Id. at __, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
40. Id.
41. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, -, 365 A.2d 748, 751 (1976).
42. See Comment, The Conditional Liability Rule-A Viable Alternative for the Wrong-
ful Death of a Stillborn Child, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 187 (1975).
43. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
1980); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb.
573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951);
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248
N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966);
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d
774 (Tenn. 1977); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
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"live birth" jurisdictions allow recovery for prenatal injuries if the child is
born alive. 44 In thirty-four jurisdictions, state courts have chosen to ex-
pand liability, allowing recovery so long as the fetus is viable at the time
of injury.45 Like their sister states adhering to the "live-birth" require-
ment, "viability" jurisdictions also acknowledge a right to recover if the
injured fetus is born alive. 48 The "viability" jurisdictions go further how-
ever, and allow recovery in certain circumstances when the fetus is
stillborn. 4
7
These two thresholds"" are by no means exclusive. The Georgia Court
of Appeals allowed recovery for the death of a six week fetus which was
clearly not viable.49 In this case, the court chose to draw the line at
"quickness." 50 There is, however, little difference between the "quick-
ness" requirement and the "viability" requirement. Both generally occur
44. The "live birth" requirement is met even if the child dies shortly after childbirth. See,
e.g., Kalafut, 239 Va. 278, 389 S.E.2d 681.
45. See Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. The Superior Court of the
County of Maricopa, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp.
256, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224
A.2d 406 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del, 258, 128 A.2d
557 (1956); Shirley v. Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980); Porter v. Lassiter, 91
Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982);
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.
App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Hale
v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955);
Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71
(1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v.
Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38
N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); White v.
Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249
(1957); Salazar v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980); Hopkins v.
McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d
106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or.
258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Nelson v.
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425
A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher,
155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.
2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
46. See, e.g., Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984).
47. Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, -, 184 S.E.2d 428, 436 (1971) ("an action may
be maintained by the personal representative of a viable unborn child for the wrongful
death of such child ... resulting from the negligence of the defendant and, upon sufficient
proof, such damages as may be recoverable under the statute may be awarded in such
action").
48. "Live birth" on the one hand and "viability" on the other.
49. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, -, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955) ("[a] suit may be
maintained by the mother for the loss of a child that was "quick" in her womb ... [and]
"quick" is a question of fact for a jury to determine").
50, Id. at -, 87 S.E.2d at 102.
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at an unpredictable time during the pregnancy. More importantly, they
both occur after conception but before birth. The two standards overlap
in many circumstances and will be synonymous in most cases."' The sig-
nificance of the Georgia Court of Appeals holding is that the line of liabil-
ity has been drawn at a point other than viability or birth.
Only one state court has gone beyond the viability threshold.5 In Pres-
ley v. Newport Hospital, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that
Rhode Island's wrongful death statute5 included a fetus within its defini-
tion of "person."54 The court based its opinion on the law in other juris-
dictions5 5 and on a prior case5" in which the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island "explicitly rejected viability as a criterion, substituting in its place
reliable proof of causation. '57 It went on to opine that a fetus is a "per-
son" whether it is viable or not.58 Just as Bonbrest and Verkennes were
trend setters in advancing the line of recovery,.the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has taken this argument the final step, becoming the first jurisdic-
tion to set the threshold of recovery at conception.5
51. Compare the definition of "viability", supra note 21, with the definition of "quick-
ness", supra note 7.
52. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A:2d 748 (1976). Some courts have al-
lowed recovery for torts occurring before conception. Bergstrese v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22
(8th Cir. 1978) (injury from negligent caesarian on previous child); Jorgensen v. Meade
Johnson Laboratories, 438 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1973) (oral contraceptive altered chromo-
somal pattern causing birth defects); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (negligent transfusion of RH positive blood years before conception);
Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887) (equitable relief for child not yet conceived
at the time of intentional fraud). Contra Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 22 (D.N.J.
1956) (no cause of action for child's injury resulting from negligent blood transfusion); Mc-
Auley v. Wills, 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d 258 (1983) (defendant negligently caused car accident
resulting in paraplegia, but defendant did not proximately cause future miscarriage). See
generally Annotation, Liability for Child's Personal Injuries or Death Resulting from Tort
Committed Against Child's Mother Before Child Was Conceived, 91 A.L.R. 3D 316 (1979).
53. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1969).
54. Presley, 117 R.I. at -, 365 A.2d at 754.
55. The court cited cases from its neighboring states. Id. at -, 365 A.2d at 751; Gorke v.
Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
56. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966) (stressing that a claim for pre-
viable injuries is no less meritorious than post-viable injuries) (overruling Gorman v. Bud-
long, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901) (in which the court followed the Dietrich example)).
57. Presley, 117 R.I. at --, 365 A.2d at 752.
58. Id. at -, 365 A.2d at 753-54 (this statement was dictum since the fetus in question
was viable); see also Danos v. Saint Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 636 n.2 (La. 1981) (stating that
life may begin at conception because of the legislative pronouncement that life begins at
implantation and fertilization).
59. See Note, A Viable Fetus is a "Person" for Purposes of Rhode Island's Wrongful
Death Act: Presley v. Newport Hospital, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 266 (1977).
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IV. THE LAW IN VIRGINIA
On March 2, 1990, the Supreme Court of Virginia settled the issue of
liability of tortfeasors who fatally injure a fetus.60 By adopting the rule
promulgated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6 ' the supreme court
held "a tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liabil-
ity to the child, or to the child's estate, for the harm to the child, if the
child is born alive. 6 2
The 1969 decision Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.6s was the first opportu-
nity for the Supreme Court of Virginia to directly address the issue of
whether a cause of action could be maintained for the death of a viable,
unborn child.64 In that case, Mrs. Lawrence, who was pregnant at the
time, was in an auto accident as a result of the defendant's negligence.65
The unborn child received injuries which impaired its development and
ultimately resulted in its still birth some two months later.6 The child's
father claimed to be the administrator of the decedent's estate and filed a
wrongful death action. 7
In its analysis, the court reasoned that "[i]f plaintiffs decedent had no
right, at the 'time of death, to maintain an action for personal injuries,
then the right to maintain the present action could not be transmitted to
her personal representative."68 As a matter of statutory construction, the
Supreme Court of Virginia was unwilling to allow a cause of action for an
unborn child because it believed the legislature never intended to include
a viable fetus within the meaning of the word "person" as used in section
8-633 of the Code of Virginia. 6 The court relied on the rule of statutory
construction that words are to be given their popular or ordinary
meanings.70
60. Kalafut v. Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 389 S.E.2d 681 (1990).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1977).
62. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 283-84, 389 S.E.2d at 684 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 869(1) (1977)). But cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (1939) ("A person who negligently
causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm.").
63. 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
64. Id.
65. Id. The driver, Freddie Gray Spivey, worked at the Craven Tire Company. Id.
66. Id. at 139, 169 S.E.2d at 440.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441.
69. Cf. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981) (holding that an unborn
infant does not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the fetus is not
considered to be a person or a citizen in the meaning of the fourteenth amendment); 1980/
1981 Rep. Va. Att'y Gen. 136 (1981) (murder of a pregnant woman that resulted in the
death of the unborn fetus would not result in two separate capital offenses under proposed
section 18.2-31(g) of the Code of Virginia because the term person does not include an un-
born fetus).
70. See 73 AM. JuP. 2D STATUTES § 206 (1974).
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The court cited to various other jurisdictions that had also chosen to
strictly construe their wrongful death statutes. 1 In addition to holding
that a viable fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Death By
Wrongful Act statute, 2 the court in Lawrence adopted the concept from
Dietrich v. Northampton3 that "an unborn child is part of the mother
until birth, and as such, has no juridical existence."74 It is this phrase that
has had the most significant impact on later cases involving recovery for
prenatal injuries. In Virginia, the Lawrence decision effectively foreclosed
recovery for the death of an unborn child. Cases were summarily dis-
missed by simply citing to Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.7 5
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the Lawrence deci-
sion in Modaber v. Kelly."8 In the relevant portions of this case,7 7 the
court held that an "injury to an unborn child constitutes injury to the
mother and that she may recover for such physical injury and mental suf-
fering associated with a stillbirth.17
This was a dramatic shift away from the all or nothing result of Law-
rence. The Modaber decision is, however, a completely logical extension
of Lawrence: if an unborn child is part of the mother,79 a mother should
be entitled to receive compensation for any additional injury to her. The
death of a fetus will not give rise to an independent cause of action for
wrongful death 0 and therefore the child's decedents cannot recover for
damages typically associated with such a claim. 1 However, Modaber does
71. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 141-42, 169 S.E.2d at 442. The court cites with approval Drab-
bels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204
A.2d 140 (1964); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Marko v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9
(1964); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
73. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
74. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
75. See Myrick v. United States, 723 F.2d 1159 (4th Cir. 1983); Houchins v. Piggly Wig-
gly, 10 Va. Cir. 392 (Wise County 1988); Johnson v. Cooksey, 6 Va. Cir. 285 (City of Rich-
mond 1986); Shoemaker v. Hotchkins, 4 Va. Cir. 166 (Rockingham County 1984); Strother v.
DeVocht, 3 Va. Cir. 161 (City of Alexandria 1984). But cf. Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1371
(W.D. Va. 1975) (the court determined that the Supreme Court of Virginia would allow the
action for prenatal injuries on the authority of Lawrence).
76. 232 Va. 60, 66, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1986).
77. The decision also dealt with the sufficiency of evidence and the size of the jury verdict
on damages. The issue of damages recoverable is beyond the scope of this Note, but the
reader should be referred to Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages
for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R. 3D 411, 477 (1978).
78. Modaber, 232 Va. at 65, 348 S.E.2d at 237.
79. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
80. Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (this section specifies the damages recover-
able in a wrongful death action which include: sorrow, mental anguish, solace, companion-
ship, loss of income, services or protection, expenses for hospitalization, care and funeral
expenses and any punitive damages for willful, wanton or reckless action).
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state that this should not foreclose the damages available to the plaintiff/
mother.82
The Modaber holding recognizes that a loss occurs when a defendant's
negligence causes a miscarriage and that the loss is compensable.8 3 In
Modaber, the jury was instructed that the deceased child was not entitled
to compensation, but "injury to an unborn child in the womb of the
mother is to be considered as physical injury to the mother."'8' While re-
maining faithful to precedent, the court used the harsh results of Law-
rence to actually justify the Modaber holding.
If Lawrence held there would be no cause of action for the wrongful
death of a stillborn child,85 and Modaber held a mother may recover for
damages associated with a stillbirth,88 Kalafut v. Gruver left no doubt.
The Supreme Court of Virginia unequivocally stated "[iln the present
case, we have drawn the line between nonliability and liability for prena-
tal injury at the moment of live birth of the child. '87
In Kalafut, the defendant admitted legal liability but denied his negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the child's premature delivery and
death.8  The child was born alive but died less than two hours later.89 The
defendant conceded that the infant met the requirements of the defini-
tion of "person" in section 8.01-50,9o but argued the statute required the
cause of action to arise at the time of the accident.91 Since the victim was
a fetus when the cause of action arose, and since Lawrence clearly held
that there would be no cause of action for a stillborn fetus,92 the defend-
ant argued that the plaintiffs in the present case had no right to sue.9 3
Finally, the defendant also pointed to Modaber to suggest that Mrs.
Kalafut had a legal remedy for the injury of the infant. "'
The court responded bluntly: "we do not agree with the defendant's
contentions ... [and] we are persuaded by the pertinent law elsewhere
that maintenance of actions like this should be allowed in Virginia." 95
The court once again resorted to statutory interpretation. Suit may be
82. Modaber, 232 Va. at 67-68, 348 S.E.2d at 237.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
86. Modaber, 232 Va. at 66, 348 S.E.2d at 237.
87. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 284, 389 S.E.2d at 684.
88. Id. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 682.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 281, 389 S.E.2d 682; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
91. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 682.
92. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
93. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 682.
94. Id. at 282, 389 S.E.2d at 683.
95. Id.
96. See infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
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brought under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute9 7 if the decedent
would have been able to maintain an action had death not occurred. The
court stated, "[c]learly, the answer to that question is in the affirmative
in the case of a live birth."98 Thus, by adopting section 869(1) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts,99 the Supreme *Court of Virginia unequivo-
cally aligned with the "live birth" jurisdictions.
V. THE ROLE OF WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
Wrongful death statutes are the bases upon which actions for prenatal
death are decided.100 Recovery for wrongful death of any person was un-
known at common law.101 The right of decedent's beneficiaries to recover
is purely a statutory creation. In 1846, the British Parliament passed the
first wrongful death statute.10 2 In the United States, every state followed
the British example and has passed a similar wrongful death statute. 0' In
analyzing the right of recovery for the death of a fetus, courts have re-
sorted to interpretation of the applicable wrongful death statute to deter-
mine if the legislature intended to include an unborn child within its
ambit. 04
Some courts hold that wrongful death statutes ought to be strictly con-
strued.105 As such, the statute's language can not be read to include a
stillborn fetus.1 06 Other state courts choose to construe their wrongful
death statutes liberally'07 and find that the legislature intended to in-
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 19,84).
98. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 285, 389 S.E.2d at 685.
99. Id. at 283-84, 389 S.E.2d at 685. "One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child
is subject to liability to the child for the harm if the child is born alive." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 869(1) (1977).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(2) (1977) ("[i]f the child is not born
alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful death statute so provides").
101. J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (2d. ed. 1985).
102. Id. at 132. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act,
provided for the first time a cause of action for certain designated beneficiaries; see gener-
ally id. at 131-33 (providing a British account of the history of wrongful death) Cf. J. CLERK
& W. LINDSELL, ON TORTS § 165-67 (16th ed. 1989) (the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liabil-
ity) Act of 1976 codified what we call the "live birth" rule in England).
103. E.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 3 S.E.2d 172 (1939).
104. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 1984) ("[w]henever the death of a
person. . .") with WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (1988) ("death of a minor child"); see
also Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954) (a statute that allowed
recovery for the death of a "minor person" did not include a fetus, even if a fetus could be
considered a "person"); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 159 (1973) (holding fetus was not a per-
son, but this holding was limited to an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment).
105. See, e.g., Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
106. See, e.g., Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
107. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971) (noting that
West Virginia's wrongful death statute is remedial and ought to be construed liberally).
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clude unborn fetuses. 108 Whereas some courts reject recovery because un-
born children are expressly referred to in other statutes,109 others use this
reference to support an argument that the rights of unborn children are
recognized by the law.110 When interpreting wrongful death statutes,
courts consistently use this same device to justify opposing views.
As is often the case with statutory construction, there is no "correct"
answer.11 1 The most logical argument when determining the intent of the
legislature regarding the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus is that the
legislature probably never even considered the issue of recovery for the
stillborn fetus. 2 In Britt v. Sears, the court stated that because the ap-
plicable wrongful death statute' was enacted in 1881, legislators would
not have given any thought to the matter.11 4 In the absence of binding
judicial authority or legislative mandate, and after "[c]arefully con-
sider[ing] the arguments pro and con,"11 5 the Indiana court concluded
that a cause of action exists for the father of a viable fetus killed by a
tortfeasor 1 The Indiana court's reasoning is typical: the statute could be
easily interpreted either way so it is the duty of the court to make the
final determination1 7 after weighing the various arguments.118
VI. THRESHOLD OF LIBmTY-DiscussION AND ANALYSIS
With two exceptions, 19 courts that have dealt with the issue of prena-
108. See, e.g., Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Stokqs, 213 So. 2d at 700 (since a Florida trust accounting statute and a
criminal abortion statute both specifically made reference to an unborn child, the court re-
fused to allow recovery for the death of a fetus because the wrongful death statute referied
only to "minor child" and not an unborn child).
110. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971).
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 comment f (1977) ("[t]he language of the
statutes varies and no general rule can be stated for their construction").
112. See, e.g., Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, __, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (1971).
113. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-8 (Burns 1967).
114. Britt, 150 Ind. App. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 24.
Whatever was in their minds is not recorded and is, at best, a matter of mere suppo-
sition. But if we may, arguendo, indulge in our own supposition it would be this: That
since actions for pre-natal injuries and deaths were then unknown in Indiana juris-
prudence our lawmakers very probably gave no thought to whether they were creat-
ing an action for pre-natal injury or pre-natal death, or whether their word "child"
was the same word "child" so often referred to a pregnant woman as "being with
child."
Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 26.
116. Id. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 27.
117. Id. at -, 277 NE.2d at 21. Like most questions of statutory interpretation, the
legislatures could amend the statute or take other steps to nullify the holding of the court.
118. Id.
119. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, -, 365 A.2d 748, 753 (1976) ("[Ilogic does
not permit the insistence on viability as the line of demarcation between those for whom an
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tal injury have adopted either the "viability" standard or the "live birth"
requirement.1 20 While each position is supported, courts usually attack
the alternative scheme rather than justify their own position. As a result,
both standards are replete with inconsistencies.
Those jurisdictions that have adopted the "live birth" standard often
justify their choices by arguing that a mother may recover for damages
associated with a stillbirth, 121 therefore allowing a separate recovery for
the death of a fetus would result in a double recovery.1 22 Furthermore, a
child that is born alive and survives must live with whatever physical dis-
abilities resulted from the tortfeasor's action.1 2 ' In response to the argu-
ment that other areas of the law recognize the rights of the unborn, "live
birth" jurisdictions point out that an unborn child's property right is con-
tingent upon it being born alive and will not otherwise vest.'2 ' Finally,
proof of causation and damages become tenuous when dealing with an
unborn child. 25
These arguments make a strong case for the "live birth" requirement.
In addition, "live birth," unlike "viability," creates a definite line of lia-
bility.12 6 Whether an infant is born alive, even for just a few moments, is
a concrete, provable fact. For this reason alone, "live birth" is preferable
to "viability."' '12 However, the "live birth" requirement is also subject to
many criticisms. The common law, in the absence of a wrongful death
statute, actually rewarded the tortfeasor."28 If a tortfeasor committed a
battery, the victim would be entitled to damages."12 However, if the bat-
tery was severe enough to kill the individual, the tortfeasor would incur
action will lie and those who are without rights . . ."); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712,
87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ("[tlhe court does not believe it necessary for the child to be 'viable'
provided it ... is 'able to move in its mother's womb' ").
120. See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233 (1986).
122. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 72 (1969).
123. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa.
487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981).
124. Presley, 117 R.I. at -, 365 A.2d at 758 (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Graf, 43 N.J. 303, -, 204 A.2d 140, 144 (a wrongful death statute is
designed to renumerate the descendants and therefore proof of pecuniary loss is essential;
proof of pecuniary losses (lost wages, earning capacity, etc.) for a stillborn child is entirely
speculative, even more so than for the wrongful death of a minor); Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d 478,
248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65.
126. Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L. REv.
258, 268 (1965). "[Slince any limitation will be arbitrary in nature, a tangible and concrete
event would be the most acceptable and workable boundary. Birth, [unlike viability] being a
definite, observable and significant event, meets this requirement." Id.
127. Id.
128. Todd v. Sandridge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1964); Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, -, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
129. See Todd, 341 F.2d at 77.
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no civil liability.130 "Live birth" jurisdictions analyze fetal wrongful death
in a manner analogous to the traditional common law view of wrongful
death. If the tortfeasor injures a fetus and it is subsequently born alive
bearing its damages, "live birth" jurisdictions allow recovery.' 31 If the in-
jury is severe enough to cause the death of the fetus however, the
tortfeasor incurs no civil liability." 2 If wrongful death statutes were origi-
nally enacted to prevent this disparity it is absurd to allow the same in-
justice to occur when dealing with the wrongful death of a fetus.
Another hypothetical situation which effectively shows the shortcom-
ings of the "live birth" requirement is the case of the unborn twins. 33 If
prenatal twins are injured, and one is born alive and the other is stillborn,
states adhering to the "live birth" rule recognize a right to recover for
only one child."" The law disfavors inconsistent results, but courts have
continued to adhere to this "live birth" requirement.
Those jurisdictions adopting the "viability" standard often point to the
previous two illustrations as justification for discarding the "live birth"
requirement and choosing "viability" instead."5 Other arguments have
been raised in favor of the "viability" standard including: 1) recovery for
the death of a viable fetus permits a mother to recover for elements of
damages otherwise unrecoverable;"36 2) issues of proof (causation and
damages) should not eliminate a cause of action and a plaintiff should at
least be given the chance to prove them;""' and 3) the law allows recovery
for injuries resulting in sterility and, therefore, recovery should be per-
mitted where a child is conceived but dies before being born." 8
The point at which "viability" jurisdictions really take "live birth" ju-
risdictions to task is over the latter's contention that the fetus is part of
the mother. Dietrich v. Northampton,"9 and subsequent decisions adopt-
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Graf, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140.
132. Todd, 341 F.2d at 77.
133. Weiti v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 277 (Iowa 1981) (Larson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Stidam, 109 Ohio App. at -, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
134. Stidam, 109 Ohio App. at -, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Graf, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140.
137. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.3 (2d ed. 1986) (rules of
evidence and sufficiency of proof, administered by the courts, should adequately protect
against issues of proof); see also Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225
N.E.2d 926 (1967); Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis.
2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
138. See, e.g., Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951);
Bourque v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 237 (La. Ct. App. 1977); McFarland v.
Cathy, 349 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
139. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884), overruled, Torigian v. Watertown News Co.,
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ing the "live birth" requirement, 14 rely heavily upon the idea that filius
in utero matris est pars viscerum matris.'4 ' But as "viability" courts are
quick to point out, a viable child is capable of living outside the womb
and it is illogical to deny recovery simply because the fetus is still in the
mother's womb.
"Viability" as a threshold also has its criticisms. As other members of
the Supreme Court have pointed out in criticizing Justice Blackmun's vi-
ability framework 14 2 in the abortion decisions, viability is a fluid medical
term that has not succeeded as a means of demarcation in the abortion
context.143 Medical science continuously narrows the gap between concep-
tion and viability. 4 4 It is conceivable that in the near future, the lines will
disappear completely: a fetus will be considered viable at condeption and
an abortion will be able to be safely performed until birth.1 4 5
As Justice O'Connor prognosticated in Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Heath, "the Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision
course with itself.' 46 Recently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, the Supreme Court rejected the trimester approach and abandoned
viability as a standard.' 4" The Court once again refused, however, to rule
on the question of when life begins.1 46
The viability standard proved judicially unmanageable in the context
of abortion. 4 9 Likewise, the viability line cannot work in the context of
352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
140. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
141. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (6th ed. 1990) ("[a] son in the mother's womb is part of
the mother's vitals").
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 455-56 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(discarding the trimester approach using viability as a line of demarcation).
144. Lintgen, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Inju-
ries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 600 (1962) ("[t]he viability limitation in prenatal injuries is
headed for oblivion").
145. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1359 (2d ed. 1988).
146. Akron, 462 U.S. at 456; see also Note, Demise of the Trimester Standard?, 23 J. FAM.
L. 267 (1985).
147. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057. Before Webster, many courts used Roe to justify the
viability standard. If a "state is prohibited from criminally punishing the intentional termi-
nation of pre-viable fetal life ... it is likewise prohibited from allowing civil recovery for
the negligent termination of such life." Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since
Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639 (1980) (citing Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 237
N.W.2d 297 (1975)).
148. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047; Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
149. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting) (claiming the Court is assuming the role of a "medical board with
powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout
the United States").
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prenatal wrongful death actions. Viability depends on numerous factors
and varies greatly between individuals and even between pregnancies.
Conditions such as the health of the mother, the health of the fetus and
many other factors within the stages of development effect viability.
150
Viability is an imprecise medical term that should not, and cannot be
transmogrified into the legal lexicon.
VII. WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE
When Bonbrest v. Kotz rejected the common law rule, the court
pointed to the fact that the denial of recovery was arbitrary.151 Similarly,
in Verkennes v. Corniea the court emphasized that "live birth" was an
arbitrary line of liability when it adopted the "viability" standard. 152 Fi-
nally, Presley v. Newport Hospital rejected both "live birth" and "viabil-
ity" as arbitrary.'5 ' Indeed, each time a court advances the threshold of
liability, they point to the previous line as arbitrary.5 5 Although "viabil-
ity" jurisdictions claim that the "live birth" requirement is arbitrary, the
"viability" rule is as arbitrary as any other. 55
But the line must be drawn somewhere.' Courts must recognize the
fetus as a separately existing entity regardless of viability.
The mother's biological contribution from conception on is nourishment
and protection; but the fetus has become a separate organism and remains
so throughout its life. That it may not live if its protection and nourishment
are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its development is not to destroy
its separability; it is rather to describe conditions under which life will not
continue. Succeeding conditions exist, of course, that have that result at
every stage of its life, post-natal as well as pre-natal.157
If it is recognized that a child is no less of a person before viability, it is
logical to extend the court's protection to conception. Potential life is no
less potential during the first weeks of pregnancy than in the last weeks 158
and a fetus is entitled to develop without outside interference. 5 9 Al-
150. See Comment, supra note 126, at 265 (discussing the problems of proving causation
in pre-natal death actions).
151. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
152. Verkennes, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); see also Todd v. Sandidge Constr.
Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1964).
153. Presley, 117 R.I. 177, -, 365 A.2d 748, 752 (1976).
154. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, -, 367 P.2d 835, 838 (1962).
155. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 589 (1965).
156. Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981). "Admittedly, the requirement of
live birth is in some sense an arbitrary requirement, but the line must be drawn somewhere,
and wherever it is drawn, it will be the subject of argument and criticism." Id.
157. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
158. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459 (1983).
159. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, -, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960). "[C]onception sets in
motion biological processes which if undisturbed will produce ... a person in being. If...
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though the argument is strong that a child is a person at viability, "medi-
cal authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence from
the moment of conception. ' '1s0
Finally, as an added measure of protection, issues of proof will necessa-
rily become more difficult as the term of the pregnancy decreases. That,
however, is a function for the jury: to hear testimony, listen to medical
experts, analyze the evidence and arrive at a conclusion.1'6 For all of
these reasons, the threshold of liability should be at conception.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The "live birth" requirement is susceptible to unfair results in addition
to being logically inconsistent, but at least it offers a definite point of
liability. "Viability" as a threshold of liability is a poor standard because
it is subject to so many factors and varies greatly between individuals.
Conception, on the other hand, combines the desireable elements of each:
it offers a definable point of liability, it adequately compensates the bene-
ficiaries, and it is not subject to inconsistencies. Proof of pregnancy (med-
ical) and causation offer adequate safeguards against fraudulent claims.
Although "live birth" can be restrictive, as a standard, it is more pref-
erable than the vagueness of "viability." In light of Virginia's heavy reli-
ance on and adherence to the common law, and its thoughtful, pur-
poseful, relatively conservative approach to legal change and innovation,
the "live birth" requirement is the most appropriate standard for Virginia
at this time. Just as it took sixty years for courts to depart from the Die-
trich v. Northampton rule, it may also take time for courts to depart
from "live birth" and "viability." Furthermore, many courts have already
interpreted their wrongful death statutes to preclude recovery for fetal
wrongful death. The Presley v., Newport Hospital decision is an impor-
tant step toward allowing recovery for stillborn infants any time subse-
quent to conception, regardless of viability.
Michael P. McCready
those processes can be disrupted ... it is immaterial whether before birth the child is con-
sidered a person in being." Id.
160. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 55, at 336 (footnote omitted).
161. And, if a jury finds against all evidence, a judge may issue a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict.
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